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Abstract—We present a simple hypothesis about a compression
property of artificial intelligence (AI) classifiers and present
theoretical arguments to show that this hypothesis successfully
accounts for the observed fragility of AI classifiers to small
adversarial perturbations. We also propose a new method for
detecting when small input perturbations cause classifier errors,
and show theoretical guarantees for the performance of this
detection method. We present experimental results with a voice
recognition system to demonstrate this method. The ideas in this
paper are motivated by a simple analogy between AI classifiers
and the standard Shannon model of a communication system. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in machine learning have led to the inven-
tion of complex classification systems that are very successful
in detecting features in datasets such as images, hand-written
texts, or audios. However, recent works have also discovered
what appears to be a universal property of AI classifiers:
vulnerability to small adversarial perturbations. Specifically,
we know that it is possible to design “adversarial attacks”
that manipulate the output of AI classifiers arbitrarily by
making small carefully-chosen modifications to the input.
Many such successful attacks only require imperceptibly small
perturbations of the inputs, which makes these attacks almost
undetectable. Thus AI classifiers exhibit two seemingly con-
tradictory properties: (a) high classification accuracy even in
very noisy conditions, and (b) high sensitivity to very small
adversarial perturbations. In this paper, we will use the term
“adversarial fragility” to refer to this property (b).
The importance of the adversarial fragility problem is
widely recognized in the AI community and there now exists
a vast and growing literature studying this property, see e.g.
[1] for a comprehensive survey. This work, however, has not
yet resulted in a consensus on two important questions: (a)
a theoretical explanation for adversarial fragility, and (b) a
general and systematic defense against adversarial attacks.
Instead, we currently have multiple competing theoretical
explanations, multiple defense strategies based on both the-
oretical and heuristic ideas and many methods for generating
adversarial examples for AI classifiers. Theoretical hypotheses
from the literature include (a) quasi-linearity/smoothness of
the decision function in AI classifiers [2], (b) high curvature
of the decision boundary [3] and (c) closeness of the classifi-
cation boundary to the data sub-manifold [4]. Defenses against
adversarial attacks have also evolved from early methods using
gradient masking [5], to more sophisticated recent methods
1The first two authors contributed equally.
such as adversarial training where an AI system is specifically
subjected to adversarial attacks as part of its training process
[6], and defensive distillation [7]. These new defenses in turn
motivate the development of more sophisticated attacks [8] in
an ongoing arms race.
In this paper, we show that property “adversarial fragility”
is an unavoidable consequence of a simple “compression”
hypothesis about AI classifiers. This hypothesis is illustrated in
Fig. 2: we assume that the output of AI classifiers is a function
of a highly compressed version of the input. More precisely,
we assume that the output of AI classifiers is a function of an
intermediate set of variables of much smaller dimension than
the input. The intuition behind this hypothesis is as follows.
AI classifiers typically take high-dimensional inputs e.g. image
pixels, audio samples, and produce a discrete label as output.
The input signals (a) contain a great deal of redundancy, and
(b) depend on a large number of irrelevant variables that are
unrelated to the output labels. Efficient classifiers, therefore,
must remove a large amount of redundant and/or irrelevant
information from the inputs before making a classification
decision. Indeed, a classifier that generalizes well, must,
by definition, be insensitive to as many non-essential input
features as possible. We show in this paper that adversarial
fragility is an immediate and necessary consequence of this
“compression” property.
Certain types of AI systems can be shown to satisfy the
compression property simply as a consequence of their struc-
ture. For instance, AI classifiers for the MNIST dataset [9]
typically feature a final layer in the neural network architecture
that consists of softmax over a 10× 1 real-numbered vector
corresponding to the 10 different label values; this amounts
to a substantial dimension reduction from the 28× 28 = 784
dimensional pixel vector at the inputs. More generally, there is
some empirical evidence showing that AI classifiers actively
compress their inputs during their training process [10].
Our proposed explanation of adversarial fragility also im-
mediately leads to an obvious and very powerful defense:
if we enhance a classifier with a generative model that
at least partially “decompresses” the classifier’s output, and
compare it with the raw input signal, it becomes easy to
check when adversarial attacks produce classifier outputs that
are inconsistent with their inputs. While we present some
simple experimental results to validate our theory, our focus
here is on the theoretical ideas; the important and challenging
problem of designing good generative models to implement
the proposed defense for general AI classification systems
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is deferred to future work. Interestingly, while our theory is
novel, other researchers have recently developed defenses for
AI classifiers against adversarial attacks that are consistent
with our proposed approach [11], [12].
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Fig. 1. Top: standard abstract model of a communication system; Bottom:
abstract model of an AI classifier system.
An AI classifier can be defined as a system that takes a
high-dimensional vector as input and maps it to a discrete
set of labels. As an example, a voice-recognition AI takes
as input a time series containing the samples of an audio
signal and outputs a string representing a sentence in English
(or other spoken language). More concretely, consider Fig. 1
which explores a simple analogy between an AI classification
system and a digital communication system.
The purpose of the AI system in Fig. 1 is to estimate
the state of the world u ∈ X where the set of all possible
world states X is assumed to be finite and are enumerated
as u1, u2 . . . , uNu , where Nu is the size of X . The input
y ∈ RN to the AI classifier is a noisy version of signals
x ∈ RN , and x depend on u and on a number of extraneous
parameters v ∈ V . Note that the state ui is uniquely deter-
mined by its index or “label” i. The output of the AI classifier
is a state estimate uˆ ∈ X , or equivalently, its label.
The AI classifier in Fig. 1 is clearly analogous to a commu-
nication decoder: it looks at a set of noisy observations and
attempts to decide which out of a set of possible input signals
x was originally “transmitted” over the “channel”, which in
the AI system models all signal impairments such as distortion,
random noise and hostile attackers.
The “Signal Synthesis” block in the AI system maps input
features into an observable signal x. In the abstract model
of Fig. 1, the synthesis function f(·) is deterministic with all
random effects being absorbed into the “channel” without loss
of generality. Note that while the encoder in the communica-
tion system is under the control of its designers, the signal
synthesis in an AI system is determined by physical laws and
is not in our control. However, the most important difference
between communication and AI systems is the presence of the
nuisance parameters v. For instance, in a voice recognition
system, the input features consist of the text being spoken (u)
and also a very large number of other characteristics (v) of
the speaker’s voice such as pitch, accent, dialect, loudness,
emotion etc. which together determine the mapping from a
text to an audio signal. Thus there are a very large number
Fig. 2. AI classifier using a information compression process and its analogy
with a communication decoder
of different “codewords” c1 = f(u1,v1), c2 = f(u1,v2), . . .
that encode the same label u1. Let us define the “codeword
set” for label i, i = 1 . . . Nu:
Xi .= {c ∈ RN : ∃v, c = f(ui,v)} (1)
We assume that the codeword sets Xi satisfy:
min
∀i,j, i 6=j
min
ci∈Xi, cj∈Xj
‖ci − cj‖ ≥ 2r0 (2)
for some r0 > 0, where ‖·‖ represents `2 norm. In other words,
all valid codewords corresponding to different labels i 6= j are
separated by at least a distance 2r0. In the voice recognition
example, under this assumption audio signals corresponding to
two different sentences must sound different. This guarantees
the existence of the ideal classifier defined as the function
q∗(x) : RN → X that satisfies q∗ (f(ui,v)) = ui, ∀i, v ∈ V .
By definition, the ideal classifier maps any valid input signal
to the correct label in the absence of noise.
Fig. 2 shows an abstract model of a classifier that is
constrained to make final classification decisions based on only
a compressed version z of y. Specifically, we assume that
there exists a compression function h : RN → RM , where
M  N such that the classifier output q(y) : RN → X
can be written as q(y) = g(h(y)), where g : RM → X is a
decision function. We define the “compressed codeword sets”
as Zi .= {z ∈ RM : ∃u ∈ Ui,v ∈ V, h(f(u,v)) = z}. We
will assume that the sets Zi are disjoint so that the compression
map h(y) preserves information in y about the label i.
We will show that a classifier constrained to use only
h(y) for decoding, even if designed optimally, can retain its
robustness to random noise w, but is necessarily vulnerable to
adversarial attacks that are significantly smaller in magnitude.
By contrast, uncompressed classifiers can be robust to both
random and worse-case noise. In other words, we show
that adversarial fragility can be explained as an artifact of
compression or dimension reduction in decoders.
Our method for detecting adversarial attacks is based on
the idea of at least partially “decompressing” the output of
the classifier and checking it for consistency against the raw
observations y. Specifically, suppose the classifier outputs
label j for input signal y. Define cj(y) as:
cj(y)
.
= arg min
c∈Xj
‖y − c‖ (3)
If we observe that ‖y − cj(y)‖ is abnormally large, this
means that the observed signal y is far from any valid
codeword f(uj ,v) with label j and we conclude that label
j is inconsistent with observations y. This, however, requires
a feasible method for calculating cj(y) for a label j and signal
y. This is basically a denoising operation that outputs a noise-
free codeword cj(y) given a label j and noisy observation y.
Generative models are capable of performing such a denoising
operation. We do not discuss the design of such models in this
paper; instead we will show that under mild assumptions on
the encoding function f(·), we can provide theoretical guar-
antees on a detector assuming a well-functioning generative
model.
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider a signal x ∈ RN , which
can be a noisy version of a codeword. Without loss of
generality, we assume that an ideal classifier will classify
x to label 1, and assume that the closest codeword to x is
c1 = f(u1,v1) for u1 and a certain v1. For any i 6= 1, we
also define ci as the codeword with label i that is closest to
x: ci
.
= argminc∈Xi ‖x− c‖. We define the sets S1 and Si
as the spheres of size r around c1 and ci respectively, namely
S1 .= {b ∈ RN : ‖b− c1‖ < r} and Si .= {b ∈ RN :
‖b− ci‖ < r}. We assume that x ∈ S1. For simplicity of
analysis, we assume that, for a vector y ∈ RN , the classifier
q(y) outputs label i if and only if h(y) = h(b) for a certain
b ∈ Si.
We consider the problem of finding the smallest targeted
perturbation w in magnitude which fools the decoder q(x+w)
into outputting label i 6= 1. Formally, for any x ∈ RN , we
define the minimum perturbation size di(x) needed for target
label i as:
di(x)
.
= min
w∈RN ,t∈Si
‖w‖ , s.t. h(x+w) = h(t). (4)
Let us define a quantity d(x, t), which we term as “effective
distance between x and t with respect to function h(·)” as
d(x, t) = minw∈RN , h(x+w)=h(t) ‖w‖. Then for any vector
x ∈ RN , we can use (4) to upper bound the smallest required
perturbation size di(x) ≤ mint∈Si d(x, t).
For an  > 0 and l > 0, we say a classifier has (, l)-
robustness at signal x, if P(g(h(x+w)) = g(h(x))) ≥ 1− ,
where w ∈ RN is randomly sampled uniformly on a sphere2
of radius l, and P means probability. In the following, we
will show that for a small , compressed classifiers can still
2Defined for some given norm, which we will take to be `2 norm throughout
this paper.
have (, l)-robustness for l di(x), namely the classifier can
tolerate large random perturbations while being vulnerable to
much smaller adversarial attacks.
A. Classifiers with Linear Compression Functions
We first consider the special case where the compression
function h(·) is linear, namely h(y) = Ay with A ∈
RM×N , M  N . While this may not be a reasonable model
for practical AI systems, analysis of linear compression func-
tions will yield analytical insights that generalize to nonlinear
h(·) as we show later.
Theorem 1: Let y ∈ RN be the input to a classifier,
which makes decisions based on the compression function z =
h(y) = Ay, where the elements of A ∈ RM×N (M  N )
are i.i.d. following the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1).
Let Bi = {z : z = Ab,b ∈ Si} be the compressed image
of Si. Then the following statements hold for arbitrary  > 0,
i 6= 1, and a big enough M .
1) With high probability (over the distribution of A), an
attacker can design a targeted adversarial attack w with
‖w‖2 ≤
√
1 + 
√
M
N ‖ci − x‖2 − r such that the classifier
is fooled into classifying the signal y = x + w into label i.
Moreover, with high probability (over the distribution of A), an
attacker can design an (untargeted) adversarial perturbation w
with ‖w‖2 ≤ r−
√
1− 
√
M
N ‖x−c1‖ such that the classifier
will not classify y = x+w into label 1.
2) Suppose that w is randomly uniformly sampled from a
sphere of radius l in RN . With high probability (over the
distribution of A and w), if l <
√
1−
1+‖ci−x‖2− r√1+√MN ,
the classifier will not classify y = x+w into label i. Moreover,
with high probability (over the distribution of A and w),
if l < (1 − )
√
N
M
√
r2 − MN ‖x− c1‖2, the classifier still
classifies the y = x+w into label 1 correctly.
3) Let w represent a successful adversarial perturbation i.e. the
classifier outputs target label i 6= 1 for the input y = x+w.
Then as long as ‖w‖2 < minci∈Xi ‖ci−x‖−r, our adversarial
detection approach will be able to detect the attack.
Proof: 1) We first look at the targeted attack case. For linear
decision statistics, d(x, t) = minw∈RN ,A(x+w)=A(t) ‖w‖.
Solving this optimization problem, we know the optimal w
is given by w = A†A(t−x), where A† is the Moore-Penrose
inverse of A. We can see that w is nothing but the projection
of (t−x) onto the row space of A. We denote the projection
matrix as P = A†A. Then the smallest magnitude of an
effective adversarial perturbation is upper bounded by
min
t∈Si
d(x, t) = min
t∈Si
‖A†A(t− x)‖ = min
t∈Si
‖P (t− x)‖.
For t ∈ Si, we have ‖P (t − x)‖ = ‖P (ci − x) + P (t −
ci)‖ ≥ ‖P (ci−x)‖−‖P (t− ci)‖. One can show that, when
Si = {t | ‖t− ci‖ ≤ r}, we can always achieve the equality,
namely mint∈Si ‖P (t− x)‖ = ‖P (ci − x)‖ − r.
Now we evaluate ‖P (ci − x)‖. Suppose that A’s elements
are i.i.d., and follow the standard zero-mean Gaussian dis-
tribution N (0, 1), then the random projection P is uniformly
sampled from the Grassmannian Gr(M,RN ). We can see that
the distribution of ‖P (ci−x)‖ is the same as the distribution
of the magnitude of the first M elements of ‖(ci−x)‖o/‖o‖,
where o ∈ RN is a vector with its elements being i.i.d.
following the standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). From
the concentration of measure, for any positive  < 1,
P
(
‖P (ci − x)‖ ≤
√
1− ‖ci − x‖
√
M
N
)
≤ e−M
2
4 ,
P
(
‖P (ci − x)‖ ≥
√
1 + ‖ci − x‖
√
M
N
)
≤ e−M
2
12 .
Then when M is big enough, mint∈Si ‖P (t − x)‖ ≤√
1 + 
√
M
N ‖ci − x‖ − r with high probability, for arbitrary
 > 0.
Now let us look at what perturbation w we need such that
A(x+w) is not in B1. One can show that A(x+w) is outside
B1 if and only if, ‖P (x−c1+w)‖ > r. Then by the triangular
inequality, the attacker can take an attack w with ‖w‖ > r−
‖P (x−c1)‖, which is no bigger than r−
√
1− 
√
M
N ‖x−c1‖2
with high probability, for arbitrary  > 0 and big enough M .
2) If and only if h(x+w) 6= h(t), ∀t ∈ Si, w will not fool
the classifier into label i. If h(y) = Ay, “h(x+w) 6= h(t),
∀t ∈ Si” is equivalent to “‖A(x + w − t)‖ 6= 0, ∀t ∈ Si”,
which is in turn equivalent to “‖P (x+w−t)‖ 6= 0, ∀t ∈ Si”,
where P is the projection onto the row space of A. Assuming
that w is uniformly randomly sampled from a sphere in RN
of radius l <
√
1−
1+‖ci − x‖ − r√1+√MN , then
‖P (x+w − t)‖ = ‖P (ci − x) + P (t− ci)− Pw‖
≥ ‖P (ci − x)‖ − ‖P (t− ci)‖ − ‖Pw‖.
From the concentration inequality,
P
(
‖Pw‖ ≥ √1 + ‖w‖
√
M
N
)
≤ e−M(
2/2−3/3)
2 . Thus
if M is big enough, with high probability, ‖P (x+w− t)‖ ≥√
1− ‖ci − x‖2
√
M
N − r −
√
1 + ‖w‖
√
M
N . If ‖w‖ = l,
‖P (x+w − t)‖ > 0.
Now let us look at what magnitude we need for a random
perturbation w such that A(x + w) is in B1 with high
probability. We know A(x+w) is in B1 if and only if, ‖P (x−
c1 + w)‖ < r. Through a large deviation analysis, one can
show that, for any δ > 0 and big enough M , ‖P (x−c1+w)‖
is smaller than (1+ δ)
√
M
N ‖x− c1‖2 + MN l2 and bigger than
(1− δ)
√
M
N ‖x− ci‖2 + MN l2 with high probability. Thus, for
an arbitrary  > 0, if l < (1 − )
√
N
M
√
r2 − MN ‖x− c1‖2,
‖P (x− c1 +w)‖ < r with high probability, implying the AI
classifier still classifies the y = x+w into Class 1 correctly.
3) Suppose that an AI classifier classifies the input signal
y = x + w into label i. We propose to check whether y
belongs to Si. In our model, the signal y belongs to Si only
if minci∈Xi ‖y− ci‖ ≤ r. Let us take any codeword ci ∈ Xi.
We show that when ‖w‖ < ‖ci − x‖ − r, we can always
detect the adversarial attack if the AI classifier misclassifies y
Fig. 3. System Modules of Using Correlation Coefficients to Detect Adver-
sarial Attacks
to that codeword corresponding to label i. In fact, ‖y−ci‖ =
‖(x+w)− ci‖2, which is no smaller than ‖ci−x‖−‖w‖ ≥
‖ci − x‖ − (‖ci − x‖ − r) > r.
We note that ‖w‖ ≤ minci∈Xi ‖ci−x‖− r means ‖w‖2 <
‖ci − x‖ − r for every codeword ci, thus implying that the
adversary attack detection technique can detect that y is at
more than distance r from every codeword from Xi.
B. Nonlinear Decision Statistics in AI Classifiers
In this subsection, we show that an AI classifier using
nonlinear compressed decision statistics h(y) ∈ RM is signif-
icantly more vulnerable to adversarial attacks than to random
perturbations. We will quantify the gap between how much
a random perturbation and a well-designed adversarial attack
affect h(y), the full proof of which is in [13].
Theorem 2: Let us assume that the nonlinear function
h(x) : RN → RM is differentiable at x. For  > 0, we
define α() = max‖w‖≤(‖h(x+w)−h(x)‖), and β(o, ) =
‖h(x+ o)−h(x)‖, where o is uniformly randomly sampled
from a unit sphere. Then lim→0
α()
Eo{β(o,)} ≥
√
N
M , where
Eo means expectation over the distribution of o. If we assume
that the entries of the Jacobian matrix ∇h(x) ∈ RM×N are
i.i.d. distributed following the standard Gaussian distribution
N (0, 1), then, when N is big enough, with high probability,
lim→0
α()
Eo{β(o,)} ≥ (1− δ)
√
N+M
M for any δ > 0, .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We performed a series of experiments3 to test and illustrate
our proposed defense for a popular voice recognition AI
classifier DeepSpeech4. The experimental setup is illustrated
in Fig. 3; a visual comparison with the abstract model in Fig.1
shows how the various functional blocks are implemented in
our experiment.
The experiment consisted of choosing sentences randomly
from the classic 19-th century novel “A Tale of Two Cities.”
A Linux text-to-speech (T2S) software, Pico2wave, converted
a chosen sentence e.g. u1 into a female voice wave file. The
use of a T2S system for generating the source audio signal
(instead of human-spoken audio) effectively allows us to hold
the all “irrelevant” variables v constant, and thus renders the
signal synthesis block in Fig. 1 as a deterministic function of
just the input label u1.
3https://github.com/Hui-Xie/AdversarialDefense
4https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech
Fig. 4. The change of cross correlation coefficients ρ(xˆ, y). Blue circles
indicate ρ between input signals y1 without adversarial attack and their
corresponding reconstructed signals xˆ from decoded labels, and red triangles
indicate ρ between input signals y2 with adversarial attacks and its corespond-
ing reconstructed signals xˆ. Low “blue circles” mean DeepSpeech runs into
recognition failure in several error characters, even if no adversarial attacks
are present.
Let x[n] denote the samples of this source audio signal. This
audio signal is played over a PC speaker and recorded by a
USB microphone on another PC. Let y1[n] denote the samples
of this recorded wave file. The audio playback and recording
was performed in a quiet room with no audible echoes or
distortions, so this “channel” can be approximately modeled
as a simple AWGN channel: y1[n] = αx[n] + w1[n], where
α is a scalar representing audio signal attenuation and w1[n]
is random background noise. In our experiment, the SNR .=
α2‖x‖2
‖w1‖2 was approximately 28 dB.
We input y1[n] into a voice recognition system, specifically,
the Mozilla implementation DeepSpeech V0.1.1 based on
TensorFlow. The 10 detailed sentences are demonstrated in the
table of our full paper [13]. We then used Nicholas Carlini’s
adversarial attack Python script5 with Deep Speech (V0.1.1)
through gradient back-propagation to generate a targeted ad-
versarial audio signal y2[n] = y1[n] + w2[n] where w2[n] is
a small adversarial perturbation that causes the DeepSpeech
voice recognition system to predict a completely different
sentence u2. Thus, we have a “clean” audio signal y1[n],
and a “targeted corrupted” adversarial audio signal y2[n] that
upon playback is effectively indistinguishable from y1[n],
but successfully fools DeepSpeech into outputting a different
target sentence. In our experiment, the power of y2[n] over
the adversarial perturbation w2 was approximately 35 dB.
We then implemented a version of our proposed defense
to detect whether the output of the DeepSpeech is wrong,
whether due to noises or adversarial attacks. For this pur-
pose, we fed the decoded text output of the DeepSpeech
system into the same T2S software Pico2Wave, to generate
a reconstructed female voice wave file, denoted by xˆ[n]. We
then performed a simple cross-correlation of a portion of the
reconstructed signal (representing approximately 10% recon-
struction of the original number of samples in x[n]) with the
input signal y[n] to the DeepSpeech classifier: ρmax(xˆ, y) =
maxm |
∑
n xˆ[n]y[n−m]|. If ρmax is smaller than a threshold
5https://nicholas.carlini.com/code
(0.4), we declare that the speech recognition classification
is wrong. The logic behind this test is as follows. When
the input signal is y1[n] i.e. the non-adversarial-perturbed
signal, the DeepSpeech successfully outputs the correct label
uˆ ≡ u1,which results in xˆ[n] ≡ x[n]. Since y1[n] is just a
noisy version of x[n], it will be highly correlated with xˆ[n].
On the other hand, for the adversarial-perturbed input y2[n],
the reconstructed signal xˆ[n] is completely different from x[n]
and therefore can be expected to be practically uncorrelated
with y2[n].
Fig.4 shows the cross-correlation ρmax(xˆ, y) for 10 sets of
recorded signals (a) with and (b) without adversarial perturba-
tions (red triangles and blue circles respectively in Fig. 4) . The
adversarial perturbations all successfully fool the DeepSpeech
AI to output the target text u2 =“he travels the fastest who
travels alone”. We see that the observed correlations for the
adversarial signals are always very small, and are therefore
successfully detected by our correlation test. Interestingly,
some of the non-adversarial signals yield low correlations
as well, but this is because the DeepSpeech cannot decode
perfectly even when there are no adversarial attacks present.
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